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POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.
By William V. Crosskey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
2 vols., pp. xi, 1410. $20.00.
Ix the two volumes here under review we have a new and important con-
tribution to the history of our Constitution. It is a work that cannot be dis-
regarded, either by scholars and teachers of Constitutional law and govern-
mental history or by the courts that must decide the cases that are continually
arising in this field. Least of all can those afford to disregard it whose tradi-
tional opinions are flouted, whose political and judicial heroes are criticized,
and whose local and sectional interests are deprived of their accustomed Con-
stitutional support.
No important written document, statutory or constitutional, can remain un-
changed in its interpretation and legal operation over a long period of time.
However great a boon to mankind, language is in a high degree an uncertain
and variable means of communication of ideas; and, along with all the other
circumstances of life, it is in constant evolution. Ancient statutes can be
wholly forgotten, or substantially emasculated by judicial and administrative
action. The Statute of Frauds, enacted by Parliament in 1677 and re-enacted
in substance by all of the United States. has been subjected to so many thou-
sands of variable and inconsistent judicial interpretations and applications
that a court now looks to the current of decisions rather than to the Statute.
If these decisions have, as many competent critics believe, turned the Statute
into an instrument for the encouragement of repudiation instead of the pre-
vention of fraud and perjury, is it not time to look back to the words of the
Statute itself rather than to the aberrant applications?
The Constitution of the United States, adopted nearly 166 years ago, has
served us through the convulsions of foreign and civil wars, through periods
of political overturn, and through social and industrial revolution. Half of its
formal Amendments are almost as old. By judicial interpretation in number-
less cases, by conscious and unconscious disregard of its express words, this
great document has suffered the same fate as have all other similar writings.
The distribution of governmental power has been frequently and materially
changed; often, it seems quite clear, for the worse.
In the present work, Professor Crosskey takes us back to the time of the
Constitutional Convention and to the beginnings of the national government.
In immense detail, and with chapter and verse, he analyzes the language of
that period, with its word usages and with the educational background of the
men who chose the words of the Constitution and of it-, fornal Amendments.
He thus portrays, with convincing 6kill, what he believes to have been the
understanding and the intended meanings of the draftsmen and of some, at
least, of the adopting voters. He thus sets forth the intended distribution of
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the powers of government and the reasons for that distribution. The men of
the Convention seized their great opportunity. The known evils of the time,
from which all suffered, made possible the creation of a new nation. Foreign
dangers, governmental impotence, obstructions of commerce, uncertainty of
law both common and statutory, ruinous inflation: these overweighed differ-
ences in sectional interest, differences in governmental theory, and the as yet
undeveloped conflicts of political ambition and economic greed. In no other
work are the individual provisions and phrases of the Constitution so thor-
oughly considered as in Professor Crosskey's volumes, with the reasons for
their adoption and the reasons for the exact words in which they are ex-
pressed.
Having made this fresh start, the author brings us down through 166 years
of changing interpretation and application, with the causes, the nature, and
the results of those changes: how the general legislative power of Congress
became vastly limited, especially how its power to regulate all commerce was
reduced to power over commerce across state lines (until more recently ex-
panded by recessive interpretation); how the common lav system inherited
from England became cut into 48 fragments of uncommon law; and how the
national judicial power of the Supreme Court has been in many of its aspects
frittered away. The reviewer cannot here attempt to follow the course of the
author's argument. He will only say that the argument has a powerful appeal,
and that from beginning to end it will hold the attention of any reader who
knows something of the nature of law and its evolutionary growth and whose
desire for the truth promptly counteracts any feelings of resentment at the
author's unexpected results.
Some of the principal theses of Professor Crosskey's work, forcefully stated
and vigorously supported by historical and analytical research, are as follows:
The Constitution was drafted with the intention of creating a sovereign
nation, and not a limited federation of sovereign States.
The Congress was given general legislative power over all matters, with
only such exceptions and limitations as are found in express words of the
Constitution and its Amendments.
In particular, the expressly given power of Congress "to regulate commerce
among the several States" was intended to include "commerce" of every kind
carried on within the entire national territory, and not merely that which
crosses State boundary lines.
The judicial power conferred upon the Supreme Court of the United States
was such as to make that Court "the head of a unified system of administering
justice," giving it general supervisory control over all State courts as well
as the inferior federal courts.
The Common Law was regarded, at the time of adoption of the Consti-
tution, as the system of law developed in the courts of England and by appli-
cable Acts of Parliament, a system national in scope and applicable every-
where, not a series of separate systems created within and controlled by the
several States independently.
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The Supreme Court was given no power to review Congressional legis-
lation or to declare it to be "unconstitutional," except when such legislation
might affect the jurisdiction of the Court itself.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 34 (Rules of Decision) applied only in
"trials at common law," not including equity, admiralty, or international la,
and customs; and the "laws of the several States" made applicable in such
"trials" were the laws that existed in 1789, without in any way limiting the
subsequently exercised powers of Congress or the Supreme Court.
It is perfectly clear that the foregoing theses of the author are not those
that now generally prevail or that are now supported by the Supreme Court.
That they did generally prevail in 1789 and that they were then in accord
with the express words of the great instrument, is supported with great force
by the author. He has collected with great industry and accuracy the word
usages of the contemporary period, as found in the newspapers, magazines,
political pamphlets, and other publications. He has made a careful analysis
of judicial opinions. In most surprising and convincing fashion, he has shovm
the influence of Blackstone's Comnicntaries on the Laws of England on the
thought and the expression of the makers of our Constitution. He has found
in the constitutional ideas and practices of Great Britain most clarifying ex-
planations for the insertion of many of the specific provisions in our written
Constitution. We need not suppose that on these matters Professor Cross-
key has said the last word; but he has fully demonstrated that the last word
had not previously been said either.
What, then, has been the cause of these great changes in our constitutional
thought and in the distribution of governmental powers among the depart-
ments-legislative, executive, and judicial? By what processes have these
changes been brought about? The author leaves us in no doubt as to his
answer to these questions. The answer is indicated in the title to his book:
Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States. It is no
new discovery that the Supreme Court is aware of "election returns," or that
its decisions have reflected the opinions and the desires of the appointing
power. But there are good "politics" as well as bad "politics." New issues
arise; and newly realized interests create new opinions and desires. No doubt,
after 1800, the opinions and desires of Jefferson and Madison were different
from what they had been in 1789; no doubt, also, they preferred to divert
attention from that fact. In 1953, as well as in 1800 and 1860, "States' rights"
rise up in opposition to "National Interest" and affect both elections and
judicial decisions. The author well portrays the work of Taney, C. J., and his
Jacksonian Court. He appears to believe that the effects of "politics" have
been generally bad, severely injurious to the general welfare; and he produces
evidence, much of it clearly incontrovertible, in support of that opinion.
It is not "politics" alone, however, to which the author ascribes the great
and detrimental changes in our governmental system under the Constitution.
One of the special merits of his work is found in his exposition of word
usages and his demonstration of the effect of the constant, unconscious changes
1953] 1139
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in those usages. Linguistic changes; changes in legal theory; changes in the
views of scholars as to the nature of "law" and of the "common law ;" changes
in prevailing views as to the function of the judges in the growth of law:
all these played a part in inducing Brandeis to lead the Court in overruling
Swift v. Tyson,' and to commit, in the case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins,2 what the author describes as "the most colossal error the Supreme
Court has ever made." This was not caused by "politics" or the election
returns.
The author is thoroughly cohvincing in his demonstration that the decision
in Swift v. Tyson was in exact harmony with the meaning given in 1789 both
to the Constitution and to Section 34 of the Judiciary Act,.and that it was in
exact agreement with the judicial decisions of the 40 years between that date
and 1832, the date of the decision. By that decision the Court made no changes
in the distribution of governmental powers, either because of "politics" or
because of word usage. Story, who wrote the opinion, was the sole survivor
of the Federalist regime; but he well knew the antecedent language and legal
theories and judicial decisions, and the other eight Justices-all of them ap-
pointed since the Jeffersonian political revolution and the product thereof-
all agreed with Story. Immediately after the decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, the present reviewer, although he had made no study of its
constitutional background and did not repudiate the decision, at once foresaw
the morass into which the reasoning of the Court was leading it.0 Professor
Crosskey presents to us ten more years of this morass and at the same time
destroys the supposed constitutional basis for the decision.
This reviewer has no doubt of the correctness of the author's view that,
the "common law" in 1789, in 1832, and for long years thereafter, was under-
stood as a single system inherited by all the colonies and the United States;
and that the words "trials at common law" as used in the Judiciary Act of
1789, did not include either equity or admiralty or much (if any) of the
"law merchant" (in spite of Lord Mansfield's recent efforts). This does not
mean that our ancestors regarded the "common law" as a "brooding omni-
presence in the sky." Undoubtedly, they had more notions of the existence
of "natural law" than most of us now have; and they may have been unaware
of the fact that the boundary lines between "law" and "equity" and "law
merchant" (and even "admiralty" and "ecclesiastical law" and other local
and less well-known systems of law and practice) had never been clean and
well-marked, and that these boundaries were becoming and would continue
to become wide zones of overlapping uncertainty. Without doubt, they had
not clarified in their minds the part played by the judges in the evolution and
proliferation of our legal system. How many minds are clear on that subject
now? Their minds were at least as clear as have been those of a Court that
1. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941) ; Comment, 47
YALE L.J. 1351 (1938).
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REVIEWS
has told all federal judges (as well as its own Justices) that they must accept
as applicable law in diversity cases, the words of a Vice-Chancellor or of a
trial judge in a county court, even though no other court in the United States
is bound to do so.
The views of Thomas Jefferson as to the "common law" may have been
more hazy than those of the lawyers of his time. He was not much of a
supporter of any "Brooding Omnipresence." He hated John Marshall, at least
after his own political victory; and he feared the obstruction that any truly
"common" law, administered by a powerful central Court, would provide to
his own political system. In 1829, there was published in Virginia a thin
volume entitled Jefferson's Reports. There had been in the possession of
Attorney General Randolph three volumes of manuscript reports of cases in
the General Court of Virginia, some of them as late as 1772. Of these manu-
script reports, a small number were selected by Thomas Jefferson, of interest
to us because he wrote both a Preface and an Appendix. With respect to the
Appendix, he thus wrote in his Preface: "I have added, also, a Disquisition
of my own on the most remarkable instance of Judicial legislation, that has
ever occurred in English jurisprudence, or of another nation, and its incor-
poration into the legitimate system, by usurpation of the Judges alone, with-
out a particle of legislative will having ever been called on, or exercised
towards its introduction or confirmation." In his "Disquisition" it appears
that this "most remarkable instance" of "usurpation" by the Judges was the
assertion that Christianity was a part of the English common law. The first
such assertion, later repeated at various times by other Judges, was by Sir
.Matthew Hale in The King v. Taylor, where Hale said: "Christianity is parcel
of the laws of England."4 Jefferson tells us that tis originated from a mis-
translation of the words "ancien scripture" in a case in the Year Books. He
then adds, as to Hale's statement: "But he quotes no authority. It was from
this part of the supposed common law, that he derived his authority for burn-
ing witches." In this "Disquisition," Jefferson defines the "common law" as
follows: "For we know that the common law is that system of lay., which
was introduced by the Saxons, on their settlement in England, and altered,
from time to time, by proper legislative authority, from that, to the date of
the MKagna Charta, which terminates the period of the common law, or lex
non scripta, and commences that of the statute law, or lcx scripta."
It does not appear when Jefferson wrote his Preface and this remarkable
"Disquisition." His Reports were published in 1829 by "The Legatee of Mr.
Jefferson's manuscript papers."
Professor Crosskey gives very convincing support for his theory that the
Constitution granted general legislative power to Congress, and that its powers
were not limited to those that are more specifically mentioned. He shows the
particular reasons why the draftsmen thought it was necessary to put these
specific provisions in express words. As much can be said also for his theory
4. 1 Vent. 293, 86 Eng. Rep. 1S9 (1676).
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that the "power to regulate commerce among the several States" included the
regulation of all gainful employment within the entire country, and not merely
transactions across State boundary lines. What a vast amount of wasteful
"jurisdictional" litigation would have been avoided had "politics" not limited
the meaning of the express words of the Constitution! Both the first Roose-
velt and the second one made strenuous efforts to recover some of the lost
legislative power, largely in order to expand executive power also; and the
recent Supreme Court has done much to expand the content of "interstate
commerce" and to extend Congressional power over a large portion of purely
intrastate commerce. This is illustrated strikingly with respect to labor legis-
lation. Anything that materially affects "interstate commerce" is now within
the national legislative power, thus further complicating the field of "juris-
dictional" litigation. Now Congress may regulate the wages and hours of men
who work in repairing a railway culvert in Pennsylvania, and also the wages
and hours of men who (also in Pennsylvania) manufacture the concrete mix-
ture for use by the men repairing the culvert. This causes Mr. Justice Doug-
las (dissenting) to say: "The Court reasons that if the man who is building
or repairing an interstate highway is 'engaged in commerce,' the one who
carries cement and gravel to him from a nearby pit is 'engaged in the
production of goods for commerce.' Yet if that is true, how about the men
who produce the tools for those who carry the cement and gravel or those
who furnish the materials to make the tools used in producing the cement and
gravel '?"5 Is the Court now repairing past errors, and doing it by the pin
point pricking method in a thousand cases (while "politics" permits) ?
What a difference the recognition of general legislative power in Congress
would have made in the matter of Uniformity of Commercial Law I And how
large a reduction of litigation in the field of Conflict of Laws ! The new Uni-
form Commercial Code would need but one legislative enactment, instead of
forty-nine separate ones. The author dedicates his volumes "To the Congress
of the United States in the Hope that It May be Led to Claim and Exercise
for the Common Good of the Country the Powers Justly Belonging to It
under the Constitution." But if the loss of power was due to "politics," it is
only by more and better "politics" that it can be restored.
A national "Uniform Commercial Code" would be given its final interpre-
tation by the one Supreme Court of the United States, binding upon all the
State courts alike. Forty-nine "Uniform Commercial Codes" will be subject
to final and varying interpretations by forty-nine Supreme Courts; and in
diversity cases, at least, the federal judges (including the Justices of the
Supreme Court) will have to determine which State Code to apply and will
be required to follow the interpretations of the vice chancellors and trial judges
of that State.
The author is far from alone in his contention that the Constitution makers
conferred no power on the Supreme Court to pass upon the validity of Acts
5. Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 17 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
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of Congress; but his ability in the analysis of relevant cases adds new support
to the contention.
What, then, is the Constitution of the United States today, the Constitu-
tion that all the judges and other officials, both state and federal, have taken
oath to support? Is it the very same Constitution that was signed and sub-
mitted to the people of the United States in 1787, by George Washington
and some 38 other notables (with such variations and additions as appear in
22 Amendments) ? The printed words, filling only 8 pages in the volume under
review, and divided into 8 Articles, are certainly the same words as those that
George Washington signed. But words are merely symbols by which men
attempt to convey their thoughts to others: and the degree of success attained
in this process is extremely variable. The ideas that the words of the Con-
stitution expressed in 1789 to the signers thereof, and to the limited number
of people who then voted for it, could not have been identical, although we
may believe that there was a high degree of uniformity. Since that day, for
more than 160 years, those very words have been the supreme written law
for some hundreds of millions of men, many of whom could not read Eng-
lish; and they have been interpreted and applied by thousands of officers and
judges. In 160 years, word usages have greatly changed, along v.ith other
habits and customs of men, the social and economic conditions, all the cir-
cumstances of life. No one has been more successful than the author of the
work under review in showing that the words of the Constitution do not ex-
press the same ideas to the people of today that they expressed to George
Washington and his associates, or that the applications made of it by our
judges and administrators in governing the affairs of our lives are greatly
different from those of 1789, or 1832, or 1860, or even 1900.
Whose meaning then, and whose interpretation, do our judges and legis-
lators and executives take an oath to support? Is it the meaning and the in-
terpretation of the 39 signers in 1787? Their hands wrote, in the language
of that day, the thoughts of their active and intelligent minds. Shall we still
be governed by the dead hand?
Professor Crosskey differs plentifully with justice Holmes; but in one
matter he accepts his theory. Opposite the title page he thus quotes Holmes:
"We ask, not what this man meant, but what these words would mean in the
mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in
which they were used." The present reviewer does not accept this dictum as
a just rule for the interpretation of a contract ;G it may work better when
applied to a Constitution or to a statute. Who is a "normal speaker of Eng-
lish"; and who is a "normal" man? The reviewer agrees unreservedly, how-
ever, with the author of the present work, in his condemnation of cocksure
judgments in ignorance of our constitutional history and of the usages and
conditions and education of the men of 1789, and of judgments rendered with-
out a re-reading of the express words in the light of that history and those
6. 3 CopmN, CoNtRACS §§ 532 et seq. (1951).
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usages and conditions. Interpretation and application of the words of the old
document to the circumstances of later times is the continuous function of
men living in those later times, particularly the judges.
While it is the function of the courts to act as the selective and creative
agents of society in the evolution of any legal system, it cannot be regarded
as their function to make new interpretations and applications of a Consti-
tution that materially vary the granted powers of any branch of the govern-
ment, either (1) with full consciousness of the variation and with intent to
improve the constitutional distribution (supported, it may be, by a political
party then in the ascendant), or (2) in sublime ignorance that any variation is
being affected.
It is a different question whether the Supreme Court should overrule pre-
vious decisions that have been acquiesced in for 100 years, on the ground that
when first rendered they were not in accord with the Constitution as then
understood (or as now understood-for example, Swift v. Tyson). The
reviewer will not here assent to the statement by Holmes (in the Black and
White Taxicab case) that when some "fallacy has resulted in an unconstitu-
tional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States" it is one
"which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make [the
Supreme Court] hesitate to correct."7 But the reviewer will definitely sup-
port Professor Crosskey in advocacy of the prompt overruling of Eric Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins and its numerous and insufferable progeny of 15 years.
No other writer has presented so devastating and so convincing a criticism
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, "the most colossal error the Supreme Court
has ever made" and "one of the most grossly unconstitutional governmental
acts in the nation's entire history." Without doubt, this will receive violent
counter-criticism; but no such counter-criticism is likely to be based upon as
industrious a research into our constitutional and linguistic history, accom-
panied by as keen an analysis of judicial decisions, as that of the author of this
work. This reviewer believes that it will be impossible to show any material
error in the author's demonstration of the harmful results of the Erie decision
as evidenced by the morass of subsequent decisions.
This is a controversial work, but a work that has long since been overdue.
It is a work of originality and a work of courage. It is a work that evidences
immense industry and keen analytical power. Its author is a man with much
important experience as an active practicing lawyer and as a law school pro-
fessor and research scholar. His work shows no temporary political motiva-
tion, the kind that destroys objectivity and invalidates judgment. His opinions,
strikingly and sometimes shockingly unusual as they are, are his own honest
opinions based upon careful and extensive research. His thinking is "wishful
thinking"; but only in the sense that he wishes our country had been run
by greater men, men with clearer minds, men less motivated by temporary and
merely local interests. Throughout, his work is written in a clear and attractive
7. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (dissenting opinion).
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REVIEWS
style; and his quotations and citations of authorities fill an appendix of more
than 200 pages.
It seems inevitable that this work will receive some uncomplimentary and
even angry reviews. This is because the author's opinions are so often con-
trary to opinions that are currently held by respected scholars and judges
and accepted as a matter of course by large numbers of people, and because
they are expressed in such positive and uncompromising form. He often does
much to dim, in varying degrees, the effulgent halos that we have rejoiced
to create about the heads of our political and judicial heroes. Certainly he
would have created less disapproval, and possibly he would have been more
effective in attaining his ends, if he had been more considerate of human feel-
ings and opinions and more moderate in his criticisms. In no case, however,
was the present reviewer offended, even when his views were contradicted
and his own heroes belittled. This is because he was convinced at every point
that the author's only desire was to present the truth, that he had used the
proper methods of research to determine the facts, and that the facts as he
found them had induced the opinions that are expressed.
ARnTHR L. ConInN'
FOR many years there have been rumors of revolutionary doings in con-
stitutional history at the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Cross-
key was reputed to be traveling around the country looking at old tombstones
and unearthing ancient and forgotten manuscripts, all with an eve to estab-
lishing novel theories about the meaning of the Constitution. Those who heard
these rumors and have since waited anxiously for the publication of the results
of his research will not be disappointed. These two volumes constitute one of
the most all-embracing broadsides ever made at orthodox history.
2%r. Crosskey's fundamental thesis is that the Convention of 1787 proposed,
the states ratified, and the early Congresses operated under a Constitution
that provided a unitary, centralized government. The election of Jefferson,
according to Mr. Crosskey. marked the beginning of a "states' rights" trend
that ran on for fifty years or so, by which time the true meaning of the Con-
stitution had been completely obscured. The causes of this shift, apparently
related to the slavery issue, are left for a later study.' For the present, Mr.
Crosskey limits himself substantially to an analysis of the meaning of the
original document.
He starts his analysis with the Commerce Clause. Under the commonly
accepted theory that the United States is a government of delegated powers,
limited principally to those contained in Article I, Section 8, of the Consti-
tution, the central government has had to build its control over economic
activity almost wholly by use of its power to regulate commerce. Consequently,
tWilUiam K. Townsend Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School
1. See p. 1151 infra.
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